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Introduction
During the course of the past three decades the 
Soviet Union has evolved from the position of a 
dominant regional power whose interests focused 
primarily on its own territory and that immediately 
adjacent to its borders into a global power with military 
political and economic interests that span practically the 
entire world Not only have Soviet interests been ex 
tended to regions far beyond the periphery of Soviet 
territory but during this period the Soviet leadership 
has also been able to build up its military capabilities to 
the point where it is able in many cases to project 
power in support of hese expanded interests Parallel 
to the substantial increase in Soviet interests and capa 
bilities there has occurred an erosion of US and Western 
capabilities throughout much of the world The result 
has been in Soviet parlance a shift in the international 
correlation of forces — i e a substantial change in the 
military political configuration of the international 
system in favor of the Soviet Union and its allies
An essential element of the changed international 
balance has been the expansion of Soviet military 
capabilities throughout most of the past twenty years 
Ever since the beginning of the 1960s — in particular 
after the Soviet defeat in the Cuban missile crisis
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demonstrated the inability of the Soviet Union to match 
US military power in regions distant from Soviet 
territory — the Soviet leadership has committed itself to 
a program of steady military expansion First of all 
they focused on the expansion of their strategic nuclear 
capabilities in order to offset the superiority of the 
United States that still existed m the 1960s During the 
early years of the decade efforts were made to secure 
the survivability of Soviet nuckar forces by the con 
struction of reinforced missile silos the placing of 
missiles at sea and the development of a first generation 
missile defense system In the mid 1960s the Soviets 
began the expansion of their own strike capabilities and 
by the end of the decade had reached rough strategic 
parity with the US 1 Tnroughout the 1970s and at the 
beginning of the 1980s the strategic nuclear power of 
the United States has been largely neutralized by 
countervailing Soviet strategic capabilities This 
balance of terror has provided the Soviet Union with 
an international strategic environment in which it has 
been able to employ its newly expanded conventional 
military as well as political and economic strength in 
ways that it considers conducive to the protection and 
expansion of its own state interests Far from making 
conventional military capabilities obsolete as many 
Western commentators had argued in the 1960s the 
nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers has re 
established a milieu in which conventional weapons can 
be employed — at least in certain circumstances
In addition to expanding their strategic capabili 
ties the Soviets have also built up their conventional 
military capabilities in Europe and in portions of Asia 
and Africa to the point where they are now able to 
project power throughout a substantial portion of the 
world Among the most important aspects of this 
development has been the construction of both an 
ocean going navy and a worldwide merchant fleet that 
also engages in military related reconnaissance By the 
1970s the Soviets had developed a naval capability that 
permitted them to play an important military role in
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various international crises such as the 1971 Indo 
Pakistani War the Middle East war of 1973 and other 
conflicts 2
In addition however the Soviets had also created 
a network of agreements with a number of developing 
countries that has given them access to the naval 
facilities necessary for the maintenance of this new 
ocean going fleet The development of long range 
transport aircraft and agreements for overflight rights 
and the use of landing facilities provided an important 
complement to the increased naval power 3
Another important aspect of the development of 
the Soviet Union as a global power has been the 
continuing commitment of the Soviet leadership to the 
expansion of the Soviet role in world affairs In the mid 
1970s for example the Soviet Defense Minister enun 
ciated the view of an enlarged role of the military in 
Soviet policy when he stated that the historic function 
of the Soviet armed forces is not restricted merely to 
their function in defending our Motherland and the 
other socialist countries Aggression by the Western 
imperialist states should be resisted in whatever distant 
region of our planet it occurs 4 The changed correla 
tion of forces in international affairs argue the Soviets 
permits the USSR to provide support to the just cause 
of national liberation and to progressive regimes 
threatened with intervention by the imperialists or their 
reactionary stooges in the developing world No longer 
is the capitalist West able to act with impunity in under 
mining progressive regimes or in suppressing révolu 
tionary movements
The Soviet leaders have continued to view Europe 
and East Asia as areas of primary significance to their 
security and have therefore engaged in a campaign 
to expand the miltiary capabilities of their country 
vis a vis both NATO and the People s Republic of China 
At the same time however in Europe Soviet policy has 
been oriented toward reducing the tensions that had 
characterized East West relations during the Cold War 
The detente policy of the 1970s generally correlated
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well with the overall Soviet drive to expand its world 
wide role since part of its purpose was to reduce the 
likelihood of Western — especially American — response 
to the extension of Soviet involvement throughout the 
Southern Hemisphere Soviet d tente policy was 
motivated by at least three sets of goals First of all the 
Soviet Union was concerned with the possibilities of a 
two front conflict against NATO in the West and China 
in the East An improvement or normalization of 
relations with the NATO countries would not only 
reduce the likelihood of conflict m Europe but would 
also permit the Soviet Union to concentrate additional 
military forces along its Chinese border
A second important motivating factor was the 
Soviet desire to acquire Western credits and technology 
in order to deal more effectively with problems facing 
the Soviet economy at the beginning of the 1970s The 
Soviet economy had entered a period when continued 
growth could come only from technological innovation 
— an area in which the performance of the Soviet 
system has proven to be inordinately deficient Given 
the persistent lack of convertible currency on the part 
of the Soviets the most appropriate method of acquir 
ing the desired technology involved a significant 
improvement in political relations which would then 
open the way for credits with which to purchase the 
needed technology The record of the 1970s is an 
indication of the relative success of this policy since 
many Western industrial states were willing to provide 
both the credits and most of the types of technology 
desired by the Soviet leaders 5
A third important motive for the Soviet policy of 
detente appears to be closely related to the goal of 
expanding the role of the Soviet state to that of a global 
power An improvement in East West relations might 
well achieve what earlier Soviet peace offensives had 
not achieved — the reduction of Western perceptions of 
threat from the Soviet Union to the point where the 
Western commitment to military defense would lessen 
and the response to expanded Soviet involvement in
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developments outside Europe would bt based on 
acceptance of the legitimate interests of the second 
superpower In many respects this set of Soviet goals 
benefited from several series of develoDmtnts in the 
Third World over which the Soviets themselves exer 
cized only minimal influence First of all the continuing 
drive toward independence in the Third World and the 
inability of moderate governments in many develop 
ing countries to deal effectively with the problems of 
economic backwardness and political instability have 
combined to bring to power throughout much of Asia 
Africa and more recently the Western Hemisphere a 
group of governments more strongly anti Western than 
their predecessors This has provided the Soviets anu 
their Cuban and East European allies the ODportumty to 
gain access if not influence in a substantial number of 
developing countries At the same time the position of 
the United States and its Western allies has deteriorated 
significantly throughout the Third World during the 
course of the past two decades Related to this relative 
change of position of the Soviet Union and the West in 
the developing world has been the unwillingness or 
inability of the West in particular the United States to 
pursue a coherent course of action in its policies 
throughout the Third World The US debacle in 
Vietnam the Watergate scandal and the exposure of 
various CIA activities in the mid 1970s all combined to 
make it virtually impossible for the US government to 
initiate any type of response to Soviet activities in the 
Third World In addition given the political environ 
ment of detente and the apparent conviction of many 
US leaders during the 1970s that the period of US 
Soviet conflict characteristic of the Cold War had con 
eluded the political atmosphere in the United States 
was not at all conducive to checking Soviet attempts to 
expand their international role by taking advantage of 
conflict situations throughout the Third World In both 
Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia three years later the 
Soviets correctly assumed that they would be able to 
intervene without the threat ot US counteraction since
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the United States did not have the will to challenge the 
expansion of Soviet involvement in regions then con 
sidered far from the center of primary US interest
The Soviet Union and Africa The Evolution of 
Soviet Policy
Before turning to an examination of the place of 
Soviet African policy within the overall strategic policy 
of the Soviet Union it is important to understand the 
primary objectives of the Soviet leaders in the areas of 
foreign policy and international security During his 
major address to the Twenty Fourth Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1971 the 
General Secretary of theCPSU the late Leonid Brezhnev 
outlined the basic priorities of Soviet foreign policy 
These goals were included almost verbatim in the new 
Soviet constitution of 1977 The USSR s foreign policy 
is aimed at ensuring favorable international conditions for 
building communism in the USSR protecting the Soviet 
Union s state interests strengthening the positions of 
world socialism supporting the peoples struggle for 
national liberation and social progress preventing wars 
of aggression achieving general and complete disarma 
ment and consistently implementing the principle of the 
peaceful coexistence of states with different social 
systems 6 Soviet foreign policy in this formulation 
operates at four distinct but interrelated levels Of 
primary importance is the protection of the security of 
the Soviet state and the strengthening of the Soviet 
political and economic system -  ensuring favorable 
international conditions for the construction of com 
mumsm in the USSR and protecting Soviet state 
interests
The second level of Soviet foreign policy objectives 
concerns the protection and strengthening of the Soviet 
position in those countries in which the USSR has 
already established a dominant position The irreversibi 
lity of communist revolutions as enunciated in the 
Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet invasion of
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Czechoslovakia in 1968 are among the most obvious 
concrete indications of this policy objective
The third level of Soviet policy is the competition 
with the West for influence in the Third World Support 
for national liberation movements aims at the creation 
of close ties with Third World leaders and the reduction 
of residual Western influence throughout the developing 
world Emphasis on social progress implies the attempt 
to use the newly established relations for the purpose of 
promoting the establishment of preconditions for 
Soviet style sociopolitical systems that will eventually 
enter the world socialist system The final element of 
Soviet foreign policy objectives is the prevention of 
general war and the maintenance of peaceful cc 
existence in relations with the imperialist states of the 
West This is seen as essential to the achievement of 
other Soviet objectives given the destructive capacity of 
contemporary weapons systems
These strategic objectives of Soviet policy 
although distinct from one another are integrally inter 
related The strengthening of the Soviet Union itself 
increases the capacities of Soviet leadership to pursue 
objectives farther afield while converselv the expan 
sion of Soviet influence in the Third World can add to 
Soviet security and development 7 The foregoing brief 
discussion of Soviet foreign policy objectives indicates 
clearly that Soviet involvement in the Third World 
generally takes a subordinate position to other aspects 
of Soviet policy — i e those more directly related to 
the defense of the Soviet Union itself
To what extent does the history of Soviet involve 
ment in Africa coincide with this view of the place of 
Africa in Soviet policy7 How does one explain the 
apparent qualitative shift (toward much greater involve 
ment) in Soviet African policy in the latter half of the 
1970s7 Is it possible that in the near future Africa will 
rise on the scale of Soviet foreign policy priorities7 
These are a few of the questions that we hope to answer 
in the present discussion In addition we hope to 
identify the factors that have enabled the Soviets to
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expand their involvement and the primary means that 
they have employed in these efforts
Although the Soviets initiated contacts with Africa 
soon after the decision to abandon Stalin s Eurocentric 
policy orientation in the mid 1950s and after tne 
development of contacts with a number of developing 
countries in Asia the primary expansion of Soviet 
involvement came in 1960 -  the major year of African 
decolonization Within a few years the Soviets were 
deeply involved in a number of African countries — eg 
Ghana Guinea and Mali — although by the end of the 
decade most of their initial efforts at establishing 
influence had failed The overthrow of several 
progressive African leaders the intrusion of the 
military into the political process in much of Africa and 
the continuing economic dependence of most African 
countries on the West led to a complete reassessment of 
Soviet African policy by the end of the decade — in line 
with the much broader re-evaluation of the foundations 
of Khrushchev s Third World policy
Throughout the 1960s Soviet involvement in 
Africa even during the period of almost euphoric expec 
tations about the rapid progress of Africa toward social 
ism was extremely limited Trade economic assistance 
military contacts and other forms of interaction were 
extremely low when compa ed with Soviet interactions 
with the countries of Asia 8 Yet even this modest 
involvement was scaled down after the policy defeats 
suffered by the Soviets in the late 1960s Only the 
training programs for Africans — both academic 
programs and training programs for technicians and 
future cadres for Africa — continued to expand 9 Not 
only were the Soviets unable to take advantage of the 
rapidly changing situation in Africa as evidenced by 
their inability to provide effective support to such 
friendly African leaders as Lumumba (1960) Nkrumah 
(1965) and Keita (1968) when the latter were faced 
with strong domestic opposition but Africa also ranked 
low on the Soviet leaders list of foreign policy 
priorities Developments in Africa during the 1960s
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were of little relevance to the primary Soviet concern of 
defending and strengthening the Soviet empire Further 
more the Soviets were not yet in a position to challenge 
Western interests in the region
The period since the mid 1970s has witnessed a 
major shift in Soviet policy in Africa — just as it has 
witnessed significant change in the global position of the 
USSR The change in policy was generally not foreseen 
by Western analysts many of whom had concluded that 
the Soviets had virtually written off sub Saharan Africa 
as an area of major Soviet interest and involvement 10 
They were therefore surprised in 1975 when the 
Soviets intervened directly n Angola -  even at the risk 
of damage to the policy of detente with the West In 
retrospect however it seems quite clear that Soviet 
policy in Angola was merely part of a re invigorated 
Soviet effort to consolidate and to expand its global 
political and military role at the expense of both the 
United States (and its European allies) and Communist 
China The more recent intervention of the Soviets and 
their Cuban allies in the Horn of Africa is yet another 
indication of the much more active Soviet effort to 
extend its worldwide position of influence and potential 
control
As others have already shown Soviet involvement 
in Angola escalated significantly in the period afer 
March 1975 11 By late 1975 and early 1976 the intro 
duction into the civil war on the side of the MPLA of 
both large amounts of Soviet military equipment (in 
eluding planes tanks and artillery) and more than 
12 000 Cuban troops played the decisive role in the 
MPLA s coming to power Seven years later Soviet and 
Cuban support continue to be of crucial importance to 
the MPLA in maintaining its position in the face of 
guerrilla operations In the Ogaden the active participa 
tion of Cuban troops resulted in Ethiopia s driving the 
Somali supported forces out of the area and in Eritrea 
Cuban assistance helped to undermine the position of 
the rebels However our purpose here is not to review 
the details of past Soviet policy in Angola and Ethiopia
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Rather we shall attempt to evaluate probable Soviet 
motives and to place Soviet policy in Angola and 
Ethiopia within the broader context of overall Soviet 
foreign policy in the Third World
In some respects the crushing of the reform move 
ment in Czechoslovakia in 1968 represents a turning 
point in general Soviet foreign policy Since that time 
the Soviets have expanded their efforts at consolidation 
in Eastern Europe within both the Warsaw Treaty 
Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance In addition while the middle and late 1960s 
had witnessed something of a reduction in Soviet activi 
ties in portions of the Third World — in particular in 
Africa — there has been a significan revival of that 
activity during the past decade This does not mean that 
the Soviets have been extraordinarily successful In fact 
the expulsion of Soviet military advisors from Egypt in 
1972 and Sadat s renunciation of the Soviet Egyptian 
Friendship Agreement four years later a^  well as the 
more recent break between Somalia and the Soviet 
Union are evidence of Soviet failures The point is 
however that during the 1970s the Soviets renewed the 
drive for influence throughout the Third World The 
goals of this drive are based primarily on a continuing 
Soviet effort to expand positions of influence in world 
affairs In 1975 Angola offered them the possibility of 
bringing to power a political party the MPLA which 
would be dependent upon the Soviets for its very 
existence and would presumably be amenable to pro 
vidmg the Soviets with the facilities to form a base of 
operations in southern Africa The value of such bases 
of operation for the Soviets as for the United States 
in the past has been clear During the Angolan civil war 
for example the Soviets were able to use the airport 
facilities of Brazzaville as a staging area for supplies 
flowing to the MPLA just as they later employed Aden 
as part of their supply line to Ethiopia Port facilities in 
Angola provide the Soviets with an opportunity to 
operate in the South Atlantic that was unavailable to 
them in the past just as port facilities in the Eastern
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Mediterranean gave them an advantage during the 1973 
Middle Eastern war that they did not possess only six 
years earlier
Soviet intervention in the Angolan civil war in 
1975 and their continued support along with that of 
the Cubans of the MPLA government has obviously 
been based on a variety of factors As Legum and 
Marcum have both demonstrated Soviet rivalry with 
China for influence in Africa was apparently more 
important than competition with the United States 12 
The MPLA victory in Angola effectively eliminated the 
immediate possibility of Chinese influence in the 
country through the Chinese support for the other two 
competitors for power (the FNLA UNITA) But noting 
the beginnings of US interest in supporting Neto s 
opponents demonstrated by the grant of S300 000 in 
aid to the FNLA the Soviets were also concerned with 
preventing the consolidation of American influence in 
Angola
In addition to the direct and immediate competition 
with the Chinese and Americans in Angola the location 
of Angola in relationship to white-dominated southern 
Africa presumably also played a role in Soviet calcula 
tions 13 The continuing and escalating conflicts of 
Namibia and South Africa provide the Soviets with op 
portumties to gain a presence in the area should national 
liberation movements which they support come to 
power Friendship with Angola and Mozambique and a 
Soviet presence in these countries facilitate Soviet sup 
port for the African liberation movements Although 
Angola and for that matter all of southern Africa are 
of minimal immediate strategic importance for the 
Soviet Union friendly regimes and the availability of 
bases of operation in the region would provide the 
Soviets with important leverage vis a vis the West in case 
of a future conflict situation Soviet vessels operating 
out of ports in southern Africa coupled with a Soviet 
naval presence in the western Indian Ocean operating 
out of Aden and the Horn of Africa would provide the 
USSR with the possibility of disrupting vital Middle
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Eastern oil supplies to Western Europe and the United 
States
After the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and 
the rapid radicalizaron of the revolutionary council 
which replaced him the Soviets saw the opportunity for 
both undermining the US position in the Horn of Africa 
and expanding their own base of operations in north 
eastern Africa Their expulsion from Eg>pt which led 
to the loss of base rights there apparently played a role 
in this decision However they soon discovered that 
their increasing support for the new Ethiopian rulers 
was strongly opposed by Somalia in spite of the sub 
stantial support that they had supplied to the regime of 
President Siad Barre After unsuccessful attempts to 
mediate in the territorial conflict between Somalia and 
Ethiopia the Soviets opted for the friendship of the 
larger and potentially much more important Ethiopia 
By autumn of 1977 massive Soviet and Cuban support 
began to flow into Ethiopia and during early 1978 this 
support played the major role in destroying the efforts 
of Somali tribesmen in the Ogaden — with the direct 
support of the Somali government — to break away 
from Ethiopian control Later Soviet and Cuban support 
were transferred to Eritrea where the Ethiopian govern 
ment faced a second major effort at secession
The Soviets decided that a unified and pro Soviet 
Ethiopia in control of much of the northeastern por 
tion of Africa was worth the risks involved Yet the risks 
themselves were substantial Not onlv did the support 
for Ethiopia result in the virtual breaking of relations with 
Somalia and the strong opposition of two former Soviet 
friends — Egypt and Sudan — but it also led to a 
deterioration of Soviet relations with a number of 
African and Middle Eastern countries and exacerbated 
problems with the West
This cursory summary of several of the most im 
portant recent developments of Soviet policy in Africa 
must be complemented with a discussion of the broader 
aspects of Soviet involvement on that continent There 
fore we will now turn to a discussion of the instruments
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employed by the Soviets in their attempts to expand 
their role in Afiica
The Instruments of Soviet African Policy 
Military Assistance and Arms Transfers
Military assistance and arms transfers have been an 
integral part of Soviet policy toward developing 
countries ever since the shift in Soviet policy toward the 
non aligned countries in the mid 1950s 14 However 
during the past decade the military aspects of Soviet 
policy toward the developing world have far outstripped 
most other forms of contact Military support including 
the transfer of weapons systems and the provision of 
military training has become the single most important 
element in Soviet relations with a large number of devel 
oping countries — especially those of Africa During the 
period 1972—1979 Soviet military deliveries to Third 
World countries averaged $3 5p3 million per year 
compared with deliveries of economic assistance averag 
mg only $515 million (see Table 1) The major 
recipients of the increased Soviet deliveries of military 
equipment during the latter half of the past decade were 
Libya and Algeria (which pay for weapons with hard 
currency) Iraq Ethiopia and Angola Not only have 
Soviet sales and deliveries increased significantly during 
the past ten years or so but the regional distribution of 
deliveries has also been extended Until 1973 approx 
imately 86 percent of all Soviet arms commitments and 
deliveries went to a few countries in South Asia and the 
Middle East With the expansion of Soviet involvement 
in sub Saharan Africa during the 1970s especially in 
Somalia and later in Angola and Ethiopia sub Saharan 
Africa has also become a major recipient of Soviet 
military equipment and the USSR has replaced France 
as Africas primary arms supplier Between 1975 and 
1979 new commitments of military support to sub 
Saharan Africa and actual deliveries made up about 14 
percent of total new commitments and deliveries In 
addition North Africa received 22 and 30 percent 
respectively of new commitments and deliveries Com
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Table 1 Soviet military relations with non Communist 
developing countries 1955 —1979 
(In millions of current US dollars)
New Agreements Deliveries
Concluded
Total 1955-1979 47 340 35 340
1979 8 365 6 615
1978 2 465 5 400
1977 8 715 4 705
1976 5 550 3 085
1975 3 325 2 040
1974 5 735 2 225
1973 2 890 3 135
1972 1 690 1 215
1971 1 590 865
1970 1 150 995
1955-1969 5 875 5 080
Source Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assess 
ment Center Communist A id  Activities in Non Communist Less 
Developed Countries 1979 and !954—79 A Research Paper 
ER 80 10318U October 1980 p 13
parable figures for the period 1956—1974 are 3 8 per 
cent of new commitments and 3 percent of deliveries to 
sub Saharan Africa as well as 14 8 percent and 4 9 per 
t  cent new commitments and deliveries to North Africa
v '  (Table 2) 15
Initially the arms export program of the USSR 
differed in composition from that of the United States 
Most important was the substantially greater role of 
military services in the American program Until quite 
recently US deliver es of such services were nearly four 
times as great as those of the USSR as a result of a larger 
provision of training and technical assistance and of a 
military construction program unparalleled by the 
Soviet Union On the other hand Soviet deliveries of 
weapons systems to all developing countries were slight
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nj cn O un O O un un Or- «N un CN O uC oco 1 'G »—  C r- *T O1— «o °0 oo m O mr-~ <"NOuT—
Cu Un O  O O O un Or-~ <o m  r- un OC\ cn m CN ■uT
«50 CN un
00 «O O  O O O un O«O r- oo CN CO '7- I-n CV m en
*" «N
o \r*'
Cs «O O  O O O un unun .— r>— m O
T Cv in UC un r— r-- r—
LD r_ On n- <—LO
Os
cz O O O  O O LO un Oo r- un TT CO O CNc un 00 m CNöbo> un 'UJ-
>*X)
u> <n «n un o O O un un<U r- «N m  CN r^ C Oc rn un CN m
C T— rn ,_ ,_3Oo
OÛc Tf un un un O LO O On O  — on O oo enö. 1 c oo r-~ oo N C mo eo 00 CN oo CN0> un nu><u■O
c
-C
5  —
^  * ra c O O  un O O un Oc  £ r- uo en c r- tî- T—o  JS O 1 on C  uo oo a s ■UT TT1- uo O  rr •^ r un
ü  -§d)
Un
C CN
»- LO
> . o
£  c~ <u— X— ra
E  a Uw  o V.<4—JJ Vu. C n> o fTJ uO  V« n U  £ wun c. 
o
(N rr
-2  E
n»
c;
<u>
O
— ra 
<  -C
s  ^
ra
<
flj
£
<
c
en
raLJ
_oj
"O
ra
en
<
-C
-O f. Cf £  -C en -a —rj C Gl c  — ra ns c1- C 3 2  on ÜJ — 1 S un
SOVIET AFRICAN POLICY
un o  o O Ln O o ry'G O  CN TT O oo 111<50 un LO en CN
»U. uo en CT\ C^
«N 1<£
u
un O  un o LO un O <uC  r- r~ CN 2Uo O  UO m un Oí
uo CN en X
Oxfs»
«S un o o LO O C \O 00 C en c ooUO TT oo en LO0\un <— •— n-
5^
5
CN
un un O c o o O f'N.0\Ci uo un r- CN C SJlÍN CN un co I1"- oo
ni- — un
C
un O  un o LO un O tO°o «— oo en en uo OC O  CN CN n- un
rn r— f-3 a
"5 cT3
O c  o o o O o Q> un r~. r - oo r - CCi n- CN o un«n
«N ’—
CJ> unc C
in un o un o un O ooc oo .— oo co p~ en E'3- uo ar 00 en i— 2 c
«n C CN X3 o
C §
5:
u
Q. vio un O un LO un O -Si
2 : uo en oo r-m — un oo ve uo ar >
un n* en oo T O(O U>«'n u— "a a; 30J $
E •V ovn 00z: —>
ra c 3 —o o 5 S
u_ T3 C -C
< en .3 2o -3 «O o
3  £ -O O— ra o en ra 4> <
S
£>
<  -cra-c un
<a
en
<
£
<
c
raLÜ
•o
en.
< 2
u  1
en L-» O
Q
1  -§
2  un
\r\ra
l_ ra
■a
2
3Cun 1
> ÌSCo 00
SPRING 1983 •  95
KANET
ly larger than those of the US and have made up a 
greater portion of the total Soviet arms exports than is 
the case in the US program 16 Since the mid 1970s 
however Soviet military related services have grown 
markedly In addition this growth was complemented 
by the services provided by Soviet allies -  in particular 
Cuba and the German Democratic Republic 17 An 
additional difference between the Soviet and US 
programs concerns the time elapsed between sale and 
delivery Soviet weapons are generally delivered to Third 
World customers much more rapidly than are those of 
the United States — within 12 to 18 months on the 
average compared with the US lead time of three 
years 18
One of the most important modifications in the 
Soviet arms transfer program during the 1970s was the 
increasing commercialization of military exports From 
the beginning of the Soviet arms assistance program in 
the mid 1950s through the early 1970s virtually all 
Soviet military equipment shipped to Third World states 
was provided on the basis of credits with relatively low 
interest rates and medium term repayment periods 
Moreover the sale price of Soviet weapons has generally 
been heavily subsidized 19 Since the beginning of the 
1970s the percentage of Soviet weapons exports paid 
for in hard currency has risen to the point that by 
1977—78 hard-currency exports accounted for more 
than 40 percent of all military exports 20
Distinct from the official Soviet military program 
of the USSR but clearly related to it is the assistance — 
both direct and indirect — that the Soviets have pro 
vided to national liberation groups and terrorist and 
guerrilla organizations Since at least the early 1960s the 
Soviets have provided such assistance to movements in 
southern Africa and Eritrea (until the overthrow of the 
Ethiopian emperor and the shift in Soviet policy) The 
network of relationships among the Soviet Union Cuba 
Colonel Khaddafi s Libya the PLO and European and 
Third World based terrorist organizations has now been 
documented beyond question 21
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No matter how one measures the Soviet military 
support program in the Third World and particularly 
in Africa the evidence indicates its growing importance 
in Soviet policy during the course of the past decade 
The reasons for this shift in the importance of military 
support and arms transfers in overall Soviet policy are 
the focus of the remainder of this portion of our 
discussion However first it is important to understand 
a number of factors inherent in the Soviet economic 
political system which affect the ability of the Soviets 
to engage in the type of military support operations that 
they have developed First the Soviet Union has 
become the largest producer of conventional military 
equipment in the world 22 Exports have become the 
most effective means of disposing of this huge surplus of 
weapons and as we shall see have become an important 
supplementary method of earning hard currency 23 
Moreover given the focus of the Soviet economy on 
military production this sector has become the most 
efficient and competitive of all sectors of the Soviet 
economy Soviet military equipment is usually qualitat 
ively equal to or in some cases even superior to com 
parable equipment obtainable from other suppliers 
The Soviets have therefore large stockpiles of surplus 
weapons of good quality and current vintage that they 
can make available to Third World states The growing 
availability of such weapons has coincided with the 
phenomenal expansion of the market for weapons 
throughout Asia Africa and Latin America 24
Another factor relevant to Soviet arms transfer 
policy has been the growth of the Soviet navy and its 
operation in waters far from Soviet territory By the 
beginning of the 1970s this fleet was operational and 
required access to facilities throughout Asia and Africa 
Arms transfers to certain Third World states have been a 
bargaining factor in Soviet attempts to acquire access 
to such facilities
The major purposes of Soviet arms assistance and 
sales however have been political Yet over time the 
very nature of the political aspects of Soviet policy in
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the Third World has evolved Initially the primary con 
cern of the Soviet Union in extending military assistance 
to developing countries was the desire to undermine 
Western influence and strategic interests in regions of 
primary concern for Soviet security — especially the 
Middle East and South Asia The 1955 agreement to 
supply weapons to Egypt valued at more than $250 
million and later agreements with Yemen Syria and 
Iraq25 were all designed to undermine the attempts of 
the United States to create a unified anti Soviet alliance 
system along the southern borders of the Soviet Union 
itself The Soviets were able to take advantage of the 
growing antagonisms between revolutionary nationalist 
Arabs and the West plus the festering hostility between 
Israel and its Arab neighbors in order to gain a presence 
in the Middle East The provision of weapons although 
by no means the sole method employed by the Soviets 
was the most effective means available to them to make 
an impact on political developments in the region
Closely related to the Soviet goal of weakening 
Western dominance in Third World areas was the desire 
to establish and extend the Soviet presence In almost 
all cases where Soviet military equipment was supplied 
to developing countries Soviet military technicians 
arrived along with the equipment in order to instruct 
the local military in its use A corollary to this policy 
was the training of officers from developing countries in 
the Soviet Union In Africa the major cases of such 
Soviet involvement have been Egypt at the beginning of 
the 1970s and Angola and Ethiopia where the Soviets 
and their allies have played a major role in training and 
even commanding the local military However a number 
of other African states have become increasingly 
dependent on the Soviets and their allies for military 
support (see Table 3)
In addition to the goal of gaining political access 
through military support another purpose of Soviet 
policy has been to provide stability for countries that 
have turned to the USSR for assistance This has 
become an especially important element of Soviet
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policy in Africa since the mid 1970s The Soviets and 
their Eabt European and Cuban allies have provided not 
only military equipment and technical assistance but 
even the military personnel needed by revolutionary 
movements or regimes as in Angola and Ethiopia to 
seize power or to consolidate that power Throughout 
Africa the East Germans in consort with their Soviet 
mentors have been providing military and security 
training for a number of revolutionary governments — 
eg Somalia Angola Mozambique and Ethiopia 
among others 26 This emphasis on the training of elite 
palace guards and domestic security police has 
resulted from the experiences in the 1960 s of progrès 
sive regimes favorably inclined toward the Soviet 
Union when leaders such as Nkrumah in Ghana were 
easily overthrown The presence of well trained and 
loyal security forces is now viewed by the Soviets as 
essential to stabilize the existence of progressive 
Marxist Leninist governments in a number of African 
countries 27
Before examining the military strategic and 
economic motives of Soviet military policies in the 
Third World mention should be made of another 
relevant political factor As we have already noted the 
Soviets have repeatedly emphasized the fact that the 
international environment has undergone substantial 
change that the role of the capitalist West is diminish 
ing and that a new international correlation of forces 
has emerged However only by playing a role in events 
on a global scale can the Soviets demonstrate to leaders 
throughout the world that their assessment of the 
changing international balance is indeed accurate If 
nothing else the Soviets have shown in recent years that 
they have both the ability and the willingness to provide 
military support to their allies The success of the MPLA 
in Angola or of the revolutionary leadership in Ethiopia 
is attributable primarily to Soviet (and Cuban) military 
support The provision of various forms of military 
assistance in Asia and Africa has been among the most 
important means employed by the Soviets to support
SPR IN G  1983 •  99
KANET
^ — OO yO ry O  M3 I" O  O  | O O O O O O O r ~ C T i  — C N O O r l — 1 ^ 1 0
3 -  ci Z  S  S  S  'S 9  2  2 “"l 2 2 2 2 : o -0 0 f N r ' * o o r ~ ------ oo_  Ö r - O Ö S S o v O C r s  r- »  ¿  (N «  o, ”
Zl 3O -
-r E
E ÉS<  C -
“ I “ *W — CN
»- £- w <7»
I c *Ë
- a í  g  C.S2
0 5 0 S0 0 2 0 0 0 ^>o^ooco— O r ^  — '/i oc O O — oo n^ -t
O O O O O «/■> o OIrt Ä_ «s. — ro _ o n— ~ wo'^*aoc^— — irT — —
O  00 m  O  
O  O  O  O  TT r- VG —
-  t/HO O 
m  m  -t  —  —v£> — TT l^
O  O  O  O  —  O o o o O O O r - o O G O r M r -
—  C  O  O  O O t O O C m i /i  —  r ^ ^ - o - c r M
m o  sO fN oo —
» W ^  wfs IA «A o 7> C ‘A <N c
r*** O  f**i 
O CN
. x ^ v - k O O  —  w - » O v \ ^  — 
( N « A f N f N f l C O ( N 0 0 »
^-AO'AC-'AO'ACX — *— r-* oo vó r~ v*. «—
■= > -
0 = 0 “
Ê ™ —
E -
-Tt -<<ac3uoOvju j J j oo-SS2S2^ui ^ “ i^
T E ^e
? <S
t» un ^ 
D  ~
** <
< £ 'Z
E «
- » a
•e E ~
E _
íaE
~ 00 ^  
O *  *
3 SU
100 CROSSROADS
O
st
d 
b 
A
fD
A
d
SOVIET AFRICAN POLICY
their claim that a changing balance of forces has already 
emerged The image of the USSR as equal or even 
superior to the United States may well influence Third 
World leaders to work out a modus vivendi with the 
Soviets or with their clients given the possibly 
dominant future role of the Soviet Union in the inter 
national system
Integrally connected with the Soviet desire to 
strengthen its global role is the continuing competition 
with the United States and China Over the course of 
the past fifteen years or so Soviet policy in the Third 
World has been based in large part on the desire to 
expand the capability of projecting power abroad in 
support of Soviet state interests These projection 
capabilities depend upon two separate but interrelated 
developments First there was the need to produce the 
military equipment necessary to exert military power in 
regions beyond the territory under the immediate 
control of the Soviet army The second requirement was 
access to military facilities throughout the Third World 
at which to refuel repair and refurbish the newly devel 
oped military capabilities The transfer of military 
equipment along with economic assistance and other 
forms of support has been employed as part of an 
overall policy of competition with the West for the 
acquisition and maintenance of strategic access 28 Since 
the late 1960s the Soviets have been especially success 
ful in creating a network of such facilities throughout 
the Indian Ocean area the Middle East and various 
parts of Africa this now permits them to exert in 
fluence on developments in areas far from Soviet 
territory
Regional conflicts in particular the Arab Israeli 
conflict were of importance in providing the Soviets 
with initial access to basing facilities in Egypt Syria and 
Iraq In Africa the conflict between Somalia and 
Ethiopia has afforded the USSR with a dual opportuni 
ty first for the acquisition of large scale military 
facilities in Somalia and second after its decision to 
support the new revolutionary regime in Addis Ababa
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and the resulting loss of the Somali facilities for the 
acquisition of new military installations in Ethiopia The 
civil war in Angola and the war between Somalia and 
Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa have indicated both the 
extent of existing Soviet military facilities and their 
importance to the USSR in supporting its allies and 
clients Without access (guaranteed by agreements) to 
air facilities in Algeria Benin Congo Guinea and 
elsewhere in West Africa the rapid and large scale ship 
ment of Soviet military equipment and Cuban troops to 
Angola would have been impossible 29
All of the countries that have provided the Soviets 
with facilities over which the latter have exercised 
substantial control have been ma|or recipients of Soviet 
military equipment most of them have also received 
large amounts of economic aid from the USSR — at 
least relative to the total population of the country In 
addition all of the countries that have provided at least 
limited access to air and naval facilities have also received 
military supplies from the Soviet Union — although in 
some cases the amounts have been quite limited It 
should be noted however that not all major recipients 
of Soviet arms have provided the Soviets with major 
military facilities — India is the major exception
A final point must also be made concerning the 
tenuousness of the Soviet position in some of the 
countries in which they have acquired military facilities 
Both Egypt and Somalia expelled the Soviets when their 
goals and those of the Soviet Union clashed more 
recent events in the Middle East have resulted in a 
reduction of Soviet access in Syria at the time of the 
Lebanese civil war and in Iraq after the introduction of 
Soviet equipment into Ethiopia The Soviets have 
apparently been aware of the tenuous nature of their 
military presence in the developing world and have 
generally followed a policy of establishing parallel or 
backup facilities For example throughout the late 
1960s and early 1970s they simultaneously courted 
North Yemen South Yemen Somalia and Egypt 30 
When Somalia expelled the Soviets as a result of the
1CP CROSSROADS
SOVIET AFRICAN POLICY
latter s military support for Ethiopia the Soviets were 
still able to use the facilities in Aden South Yemen In 
West Africa as well the Soviets have developed a 
parallel set of facilities in Benin Guinea Bissau Equato 
rial Guinea Congo and Mali 31
In addition to the political and military security 
aspects of the Soviet arms assistance program there is 
also the growing importance of the hard currency 
earnings that the Soviets derive from arms sales 32 For 
the period 1973—78 an estimated 43 percent of all 
military deliveries were paid for in hard currency — 
$7 390 million of a total of $17 200 million This 
represents approximately one third of the total hard 
currency deficit in merchandise trade experienced by 
the Soviet Union during those years (see Table 4) Ever 
since the rise in OPEC oil prices and the resulting avail 
ability of large amounts of hard currency in a number of 
oil producing countries the Soviets have been receiving 
hard currency for most weapons shipped to the Middle 
East In Africa however only Algeria and Libya which 
became major purchasers of Soviet weapons during the 
past decade pay for their purchases with hard currency 
What is clear from the available evidence is the fact 
that arms exports to Third World states have become an 
important source of hard currency and that they now 
play a major role in covering the deficits in Soviet trade 
with the industrial West Although the economic factor 
is not the most important influence determining Sovie 
arms transfers (and in Africa it plays a very small role) 
it is likely that it increasingly comes into consideration 
as the Soviet leadership makes its decisions concerning 
the value of providing arms to various Third World 
customers
The Instruments of Soviet African Policy 
Economic Assistance and Trade
A second important element of Soviet policy m the 
Third World is the development of economic ties both 
through economic assistance ana commercial rela 
tions 33 Until Stalin s death in 1953 and the beginnings
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of the collapse of the Western colonial empires in Africa 
in the mid 1950s the Soviets had established virtually 
no political or economic ties with the continent In 
1955 for example the USSR s trade with sub Saharan 
Africa totalled only $20 9 million all of this trade was 
with South Africa and the Gold Coast (Ghana) and it 
consisted almost entirely of Soviet imports of wool and 
cocoa beans 34 In the next 25 years however Soviet 
trade expanded to approximately $509 million in 1975 
and $1 100 five years later (see Table 5) In addition 
during the period 1954—1979 the Soviets extended 
economic credits valued at about $4 115 million to 
Africa This amount represents more than 22 percent of 
all Soviet aid commitments to developing countries 
although almost half of these credits have been 
promised to a single country Morocco for a single 
project
As early as the 1950s the role of economic assist 
ance to developing countries in the overall policy of 
peaceful coexistence began to be explained by Soviet 
commentators Soviet assistance supposedly provided 
the newly independent states with the possibility of 
developing their economies and reducing their economic 
dependence on the imperialist West 35 The major focus 
of Soviet assistance within the economies of the 
recipient countries has been on the development of the 
state sector and credits are supposedly not dependent 
upon any political military or other economic condì 
tions that are unacceptable to a developing country 
However the major recipients of Soviet assistance have 
generally been those countries that have been willing to 
follow at least in part Soviet guidance concerning the 
form of their economic development or those countries 
that are strategically located in relationship to overall 
Soviet global interests
Unlike Western economic assistance to developing 
countries which includes a substantial percentage of 
non repayable grants Soviet assistance consists almost 
exclusively of repayable credits that generally carry an 
interest rate of 2 5—3 0 percent and a repayment period
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of 12 years Most Soviet credits have been allocated for 
the construction of ma)or proiects that are supposed to 
add to the overall productive capabilities of the re 
cipient countries
Although Soviet aid commitments to Africa appear 
substantial — more than $4 billion — they must be 
viewed in perspective First of all African countries 
have generally ranked quite low on the list of Soviet aid 
recipients in comparison with countries from other 
geographical regions or in relationship to the aid 
received from the West Minus the single commitment of 
$2 billion made to Morocco in 1978 for the exploitation 
of phosphates Soviet aid committed to Africa com 
prises only 11 6 percent of total aid of which 5 per 
cent has gone to North Africa and the remaining 6 6 
percent to 29 other African states (see Table 6) In 
the first years of African independence in the early 
1960s, the Soviets extended relatively large amounts of 
aid to a number of African countries Assistance to 
Africa for the years 1959—64 made up about one fourth 
of all new commitments of Soviet developmental aid 
This was the period of Soviet optimism concerning the 
direction that the new African states would take 
especially in their relations with the Soviet Union and 
the West Although Soviet aid was offered to a relatively 
wide range of African countries it was concentrated on 
those that gave greatest promise of following a non 
capitalist path of development and of restricting the 
activities of the capitalist West Of the $747 million in 
aid committed to sub Saharan Africa during this period 
$442 was offered to Ghana Guinea and Mali — all 
states that the Soviets viewed as especially promising 
After the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 and 
the internal events in Africa that resulted in the elimina 
tion of friendly regimes in Ghana and Mali Soviet 
optimism about the success of their policies in Africa 
waned New commitments of aid fell o ff drastically and 
during the period 1964—69 Africa was awarded only 
about 10 percent of all new Soviet aid The early 1970s 
witnessed a continuing decline in the relative position of
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Table 6 Soviet economic assistance extended to Africa 1954-1979  
(In millions of current US dollars)
1954 -1 9 7 9 1978 1979
TOTAL
Amo t P c t Am t P c t Amo t P c t
All De lop g Co nt s 18 190 100 0 3 707 100 0 1 720 100 0
AFRICA 4 115 22 6 010 54 2 95 5 5
North A frica 2 920 16 1 2 000 54 0 0
Alge a 715 3 9 0 _ 0
Maur tanla 10 0 1 0 _ 0
Morocco 2 100 11 5 2 000 54 0 0
Tun sia 95 0 5 0 _ 0
Sub-Saha an A f  tea 1 200 6 6 10 0 3 95 5 5
Angola 15 0 1 gl gl 0
B i 5 gl 0 - 0
Cam oo 10 0 1 0 _ 0 _
Cape Ve de 5 gl 5 0 1 0 _
Ce t al A f ca R pubi c 5 gl 0 _ 0 _
Chad 5 gl 0 - 0
Co go 30 0 2 0 - 0
Equato al G ea gl gl 0 _ 0 __
Ethiop a 225 1 3 gl egl 95 5 5
Gamb a egl gl 0 _ 0
Gha a 95 0 5 0 - 0 _
G nea 210 1 2 0 _ 0
G a 8 s u 10 0 1 0 _ 0 _
Ke ya 45 0 2 5 0 1 0 _
Madagasca 20 0 1 0 _ 0 _
Mal 90 0 5 gl negl 0
Mau ti s 5 egl 0 - 0 _
Mozamb qu 5 n gl 0 _ 0
N ge g' n gl 0 - 0 _
N g a 5 egl 0 - 0 _
Rwanda n gl gl 0 - 0 _
Se gai 10 0 1 0 - 0 _
S a Leo e 30 0 2 0 _ 0 _
Somalia 165 0 9 0 0 _
S dan 6s 0 4 0 _ 0 _
Tanzan a 40 0 2 0 _ 0 _
Uga da 15 0 1 0 _ 0 __
Upp Volta 5 gl 0 _ 0 _
Zambia 15 0 1 0 _ 0 _
Oth s 70 0 4 0 - 0 -
Of the total $ 18 190 m II o ad comm tted th o gh 19 9 o ly an st m ted 
Î8  170 has act ally b d sir b ted I ce t ye s d sir b t on of So t a d  has 
bee a ag ng about $500 m II on nually
Sou ces C nt al I t II g c Age cy Nat o al Fo gn Asessm t Ce te Communist 
A d Act ites  n Non Comm n st Less D elop d Co nt s 1979 and 1 9 5 4 - 0 A 
Resea ch Pape ER 80 10308U O tobe 1 «SO pp 18-19  dem Commun st A d to 
Non Communist Less De eloped Count es 1978 A Resea en Pape ER 79 10401U  
Septembe 1979 pp 7 -8
Note Compo ts may not total b ca s of o d g to ea est 5
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Africa in Soviet assistance programs with commitments 
to Africa representing only 7 5 percent of new aid 
($307 million of $4 billion) Since 1975 Africa has 
received aid valued at $2 345 million (29 percent of 
total new commitments) However if the credit of 
$2 000 million to Morocco is excluded the percentage 
drops to 7 1
As we have noted Soviet economic assistance has 
been expended primarily for the supply of machinery 
and equipment for complete projects and has focused 
exclusively on the state sector Through 1971 about 75 
percent of all Soviet assistance to Africa went to the 
development of energy and heavy industry 36 As of late 
1977 the Soviets had economic and technological 
cooperation agreements with 27 African countries that 
called for approximately 200 projects in industry 
agriculture transport and geological exploration of 
these about one half had been completed 37
Important elements of Soviet assistance programs 
in Africa have been the provision of Soviet technicians 
to assist recipient countries in the construction and 
operation of new plants the training of Africans both 
at home and in the Soviet Union and the education of 
African students in Soviet universities 38 Of the African 
students 86 percent came from south of the Sahara in 
1979 with the largest groups from Ethiopia (1 600) 
Nigeria (1 030) Madagascar (1 000) Algeria (950) 
and the Congo (800) 39
Soviet academic and technical training programs in 
Africa — as elsewhere in the Third World — have two 
major goals In the first place they are designed to 
provide the skilled personnel required to modernize the 
economies of the African countries and to staff the 
projects and programs inaugurated with Soviet assist 
ance In this respect they represent an important com 
ponent of the overall Soviet economic assistance 
program In addition however they have the broader 
political purpose of training a future African elite that 
at a minimum will be favorably disposed toward the 
Soviet Union 40
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Closely related to the development of Soviet 
economic assistance programs in Africa has been the 
expansion of Soviet commercial relations This inter 
relationship has developed because Soviet exports have 
been based in large part on the export of machinery and 
equipment for assistance projects and because in some 
cases Soviet imports have come from projects originally 
financed by Soviet assistance Although the Soviets were 
willing to accept negative trade balances with African 
countries in the 1960s as a means of opening up new 
markets trade in recent years has been based primarily 
on economic criteria of interest to the Soviets them 
selves Exports to African countries as well as toother 
developing countries provide the Soviets with markets 
for industrial products that are not usually competitive 
on the world market In return the Soviets usually 
receive agricultural products or raw materials needed by 
the Soviet economy For example approximately 
two thirds of Soviet imports from Guinea consist of 
bauxite almost all imports from Ghana and Nigeria are 
made up of cocoa beans and cocoa butter and wine 
comprises 80 percent of the imports from Algeria 41
Since 1960 reported Soviet trade with Africa 
excluding Egypt has increased by 33 times from $70 
million in 1960 to $2 378 million in 1980 However 
since Soviet trade with the entire world expanded ex 
tremely rapidly during this period African trade as a 
percentage of total Soviet trade remained extremely 
low 0 6 percent in 1960 and 1 64 percent in 1980 
In 1980 for example Soviet trade with India was twelve 
percent more than trade with all of Africa Overall there 
fore Soviet African trade has been an inconsequential 
portion of the total Soviet foreign commercial activities 
Moreover with few exceptions trade with the USSR is 
a very small portion of the trade of African countries
The Instruments of Soviet African Policy 
Political Ties
Before concluding this examination of the place of 
Africa in overall Soviet security policy it is important to
110 •  CROSSROADS
S O V IE T  A F R IC A N  P O L IC Y
note that military contacts and economic relations are 
not the sole instruments employed by the Soviets in 
developing and strengthening their position in Africa 
We have already mentioned on several occasions the 
important role that Soviet allies have been playing in 
conjunction with the Soviets in providing support to 
African states Cuba and the GDR have been especially 
active in this regard but other East European states 
have also played an active role In the military and 
political realms there has been a substantial degree of 
coordination of the policies of the Warsaw Pact states 
including the USSR and of Cuba in Africa The Soviets 
and their allies have emphasized support for ideological 
ly compatible African regimes as a means of obtaining 
strategic benefits and building the foundations for 
future political influence on the African continent 42
Ever since the late 1950s at various international 
forums the Soviet Union has supported African states in 
their conflicts with the West Most important has been 
Soviet support for decolonization and the USSRs 
general advocacy of African positions vis a vis the West 
Throughout the 1970s the level of the USSR s political 
contacts with Africa has expanded significantly First of 
all the Soviets have added a number of African states 
to the network of friendship treaties signed with Third 
World states By 1981 Angola Mozambique and 
Ethiopia had all signed such agreements with the Soviet 
Union 43 In addition to the development of expanded 
formal state to state relations the Soviets and their 
communist allies have attempted to establish close ties 
with ruling parties in Africa By the 1960s such relation 
ships had begun to develop and representatives from 
ruling parties in Ghana Guinea and Mali participated in 
the congresses of the Soviet and East European Com 
munist parties A clear purpose of the development of 
such ties with African revolutionary parties has been the 
attempt to influence the policy orientation of those 
parties Virtually all of the ruling European Communist 
parties have signed agreements with African parties to 
provide for bilateral exchange of visits experience and
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documents study tours by the African parties to 
Eastern Europe to examine the work of Central Com 
mittee agitprop mass organizational ideological and 
foreign affairs departments and courses of study for the 
training of African party cadres 44 The major African 
partners in these agreements are the Congolese Workers 
Party the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) 
and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
(MPLA) In addition the Soviets and East Europeans 
developed close relations with Joshua Nkomos 
Zimbabwe African People s Union (ZAPU) prior to Zim 
babwe s independence and with both the African 
National Congress of South Africa and the Southwest 
African People s Organization (SWAPO) 4S
During the decade of the 1970s the Soviets and 
their European allies enlarged their political activity in 
Africa significantly The collapse of the Portuguese 
colonial empire and the radicalizaron of a number of 
other African States plus the expanded role of the 
Soviet Union and its European allies in world politics 
have provided an environment favorable to increased 
political activity on the part of the Communist states In 
Africa they have focused on the development of long 
term relationships with African states committed to 
some form of Marxist Leninist socialism Their ex 
periences with radical allies in the 1960s has convinced 
the Communist leaders that stable relationships must be 
built on a confluence of interests on both sides and that 
an important element of such a confluence is the exist 
enee in Africa of strong socialist party organizations 
However as we have already seen political support con 
tinues to be tied to military security support
Security Issues in Soviet African Policy 
A Preliminary Assessment
We return now to the question posed at the begin 
nmg of this essay concerning the place of Africa in 
overall Soviet security policy In spite of the significant 
expansion of Soviet involvement in the affairs of the 
continent during the past decade Africa still remains of
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secondary importance in overall Soviet policy and 
operates at the level of competition with the West for 
strategic access and influence The Soviets have 
attempted to take advantage of regional conflict 
situations in Angola the Horn and elsewhere in order to 
strengthen their position vis a vis the West To a substan 
tial degree Soviet policy in East and Northeast Africa 
can be seen as a complement to Soviet policy in the 
Middle East and the Indian Ocean region As Nimrod 
Novik points out the initial involvement of the USSR in 
Somalia was part of a larger concern for the establish 
ment of a multiplicity of military facilities in the Red 
Sea region that was related to Soviet involvement in 
Egypt 46
It is important to remember however that the 
record of Soviet successes in Africa — and in the Third 
World more broadly — is quite mixed To a great extent 
their policy and its successes and failures have depended 
on local developments over which they have exercised 
little or no control The death of a Nasser the seizure of 
power by a Mengistu and similar developments have 
been extremely important for Soviet policy The growth 
of arms transfers to the Third World and the ability to 
gain access to overseas military facilities have resulted 
more from external circumstances than thev have from 
Soviet policy initiatives The expansion of regional con 
flicts — such as that in the Horn of Africa — and the 
availability of surplus iincome in the oil producing states 
such as Libya have been major factors in the expansion 
of the market for Soviet armaments as well as for those 
from the Western states The acquisition of military 
facilities by the Soviets has often been viewed by the 
host countries as a method of enhancing their own 
military security against a regional opponent as in 
Egypt and Somalia during the periods of their close rela 
tions with the Soviet Union Yet although the USSR 
has expanded its activities and capabilities in large areas 
of the developing world including Africa it is still 
unable to dictate developments as it can to some degree 
at least in Eastern Europe
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Soviet goals in Africa have included 1) the reduc 
tion of Western military and political influence 2) the 
containment of possible Chinese influence 3) the 
establishment of a network of military facilities that will 
enable Soviet military forces to proiect power in regions 
far from the Soviet homeland 4) the possible economic 
benefits that can be gained for the Soviet economy 
Soviet military assistance and arms transfer programs as 
a part of overall policy toward the developing countries 
are motivated primarily by political and strategic 
concerns and have been related to Soviet support for 
ideologically compatible allies the search for strategic 
benefits and the building of foundations for future 
political influence
However Soviet policy in Africa still suffers from 
serious weaknesses First of all there are the checks on 
that policy presented by the African countries them 
selves As the expulsion of Soviet military advisors from 
both Egypt and Somalia has demonstrated military 
presence alone does not guarantee influence or stability 
of the Soviet relationship with the host country 
Changes in political perspective or policy orientation on 
the part of the African host can result in a deterioration 
of relations with the Soviets
The activities — or possible activities of the USSR s 
major competitors represent a second set of limits to 
the success of Soviet policy in Africa So far Soviet 
successes have all occurred in the absence of concert 
ed Western opposition In Angola the US administration 
was in no position to respond to Soviet Cuban initiatives 
because of domestic opposition resulting from the 
traumatic experiences of Vietnam and Watergate In the 
Horn the fact that the Soviets were backing the recog 
mzed government of Ethiopia against foreign interven 
tion made it highly unlikely that the US would respond 
with military assistance to Somalia — a country with 
which its relations were virtually non existent at the 
time of the crisis In the ensuing years even prior to the 
election of Ronald Reagan however US policy has
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shifted and the Sovi b are likely to face active US 
opposition to any future adventures
However probably the greatest limiting factor on 
Soviet policy in Africa is the Soviets inability to offer 
Africa much beyond military equipment and training 
Even those African states which have committed them 
selves to some form of Marxism Leninism (Angola 
Ethiopia and Mozambique) have not severed their 
economic ties with the West It is only in the West that 
they can find the economic assistance the goods and 
the markets that they require for their own economic 
development The marginal role that the Soviet Union 
plays in the foreign trade of virtually all of Africa and 
the unwillingness — or even inability — of the Soviets to 
provide expanded markets or additional economic assist 
ance to Africa are likely to continue to limit the Soviet 
role in countries for which economic construction 
rather than military security is the primary problem
In spite of these limitations on Soviet African 
policy the unsettled situation in much of Africa will 
offer the Soviets additional opportunities for involve 
ment Yet given the geographic location of the con 
tinent Africa will continue to remain of only secondary 
importance for overall Soviet security policy and there 
fore the Soviet leadership is not likely to run the risk of 
direct confrontation with the United States merely to 
enhance its position in Africa
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